Abstract:

"The Belt and Road" is a strategic decision for China to expand and deepen its opening up in the new era. This grand plan further strengthens mutually beneficial cooperation between China and the rest of the world. The in-depth implementation of the "The Belt and Road" strategy provides an unprecedented opportunity for Chinese medicine to go abroad and achieve internationalization. On the other hand, Chinese medicine is also facing many challenges in the process of internationalization, such as background differences, loss of intellectual property rights, trade barriers, and product quality and safety. The research on the quality and safety of pharmaceutical products in the process of internationalization of traditional Chinese medicine in the context of the “Belt and Road” is based on the existing well-functioning internationalization model of Chinese medicine, and fully considers domestic enterprises and foreign countries involved in product quality supervision. The product quality monitoring behavior of the cooperative institutions and the joint regulatory agencies, with the goal of maximizing the interests of all parties, constructed a three-party static game model. By studying the impact of factors such as monitoring costs on the quality monitoring behavior of tripartite products, it can be found that the cost of supervision, the intensity of supervision, and the possible losses caused by non-regulation play a decisive role in whether or not the parties conduct product quality monitoring.

Key words: the Belt and Road, Chinese medicine product quality, multi-party game, endless information